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THE STRUCTURE OF ACT IN THE LA W 
Norio HAMAGAMI* 
1 General Conception of Law and Act in the Law 
The act in the law， according to the traditional view， isunderstood as the legal 
specification which the law renders the legal effect in order to meet the wil1 of a party. 
On the other hand， some recent theories assert that act in the law is the act to establish 
the law. Therefore， we must， here， review that if these two views contradict each 
other， or are compatible and stating the partial truth. 
This article intends to solve this question by examining the structure of act in the 
law. 
If we understand according to the assertion of recent theories， act in the law 
as the act to establish， the relation between the 1aw in general and act in the laws must 
be clarified. For that purpose， first of al1， we must grasp the trincity of the 1aw exact岨
1y. Though we can not dewel1 on the problem about the trincity of the law in detail， 
1egal norm， asexamined of its structure， can be defined as fol1ows. 
“Our activity of wil1， that is the life itse1f， can be devisible to‘for the man himse1f' 
and ‘for the wi1 of other.' Putting the act of wi1 for the man himself aside， the act of wil1 
to others， can furthermore， be classified， according to the author's view， into two groups. 
Namely， the one is the act which does not inflict the act of wil1 of others， whi1e the other 
is the act which induces the act of will of others. We can observe， inany case of the 
activity of the wi1， alway， the presence of the standard， which we cal1 the social norm. 
If， as mentioned above， there are two kinds af acts of wi1 for others， we can， ac同
cordingly， understand easi1y that there must be two kinds of standards for such acts 
of wil. The standard of the second kind is the lega1 norm， ie.， the standard gegulat-
ing the act of will of a man for other peop1e inflicting the act of will of others. Here 
is the fundamental merkmal for distinguishing the law from al1 other social norms"月
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Legal norm， can be devided， from the point of its structure， into two norms. One 
is the general instruction which can be expressed in the form of “you must do such 
and such..." While the other is the instruction，“if you fail to observe above in-
はruction，you must acknowledge， disregarding your wi1， the wil1 of the other party". 
The law can come into being by coordinating such two instructions.2) The law， thus 
in this sense， isa norm having double“structures. Namely， one legal norm is constituted 
with coordination of the primary norm of “you must do such and such" and the 
secondary，“if you fail to observe such an instruction， you must acknowledge the will 
of other partyぺ Theprimary norm is the standard for the act of will of a man without 
inflicting the direct act of will of other party. The secondary norm is the standard 
which connects the will of one party and the other party. Since the primary norm 
is presupposing the secondary one to succeed， incase of the will of one party fails to 
observe the primary instruction， the secordary norm instructs to acknowledge the act 
of wi1l of other party. The secondary norm is not meant for the actual compulsion 
but a proposition. Savigny3) and Kelsen4) understood， correctly， the trinsity of the 
law and of its double-structures. It seems to the author that Savigny was， most pro“ 
bably， thinking of this double-structures of legal norms when he explained the trin-
sity of the right as the domination of the wil1 of man by others. Kelsen also expounds 
the double-structures of the law from the point of his “pure leagl theory". Laws are 
always norms of double回structures，but not al1 norms of double-structures are called 
laws and dealt actually as legal norms. 
Clear田cutdistinction must be observed between the facts of “it is actual1y the law， 
or it exists as the law" and “we cal1 it the law， orwe deal it as the lawぺItdepends 
on the kind of society that which of norms of double structures we cal as the law or 
deal as the law. 
Generally， only the norms of double-structures being applied to al1 the territory， 
in the organized society such as the state， are cal1ed the laws and dealt as the laws. 
Y ou can have proofs wh巴nyou consider the “lebendiges Recht". Such legal norms 
(of double-structures) can exist in the society of even two persons. 
The private person can， even if there is no state， establish the legal norms. The 
society as organized such as the state， for the purpose of the maintena 
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law. First， there exisits the law-making act as the legal fact and then the law冊making
act is ruled by the supervising legal norms， then the conception of act in the law， is to 
be found. Legal norms which are established autonomicalIy by private persons are to 
be ruled by the civillaw and other laws of the state. And some legal norms are appre制
ciated and given the sanction of the state， while others. are denied， and r巴fusedto be 
given the sanction.5) Only in act in the law， there is the problem of being either null 
or valid. And in torts and quasi contracts there are no problems of being null or va1id， 
which is due to that they lack law-making act. 
The civil law presupposing the private persons being capable to establish legal 
norms， acknowledges the act of estabIishing the legal norms of the private persons 
themselves within the limit approved by the civil law， and by such legal norms to 
regulate their social activities， which is so・caIledprivate autonomy. 
It is evident， since there is the dispositive laws in the civil law system， that the 
civillaw acknowledges such private autonomy. The nature of dispositive law is， when 
a party establishes legal norm of double四structureswhich is different from the disposト
tive law， torefuse the application of itself. 
The civil law which gives the legal effect to the legal norm which is established 
by a private person autonomically， iscaIled the law of authorization. The nature of 
law of authorization is， within the limit of its permission， only when a private person 
actually wills the content of legal norms which a private person establishes， toconfer 
the legal effect. In the content of law of autorization， there is no existance of will for 
the legal effect which is to be given by the law of authorization to a party. 
Since the law of authorization is， within the limit of its permission， only when 
a private person actuaIIy wi1s the content of legal norms which is established by private 
person， togive the legal effect of civil law to the legal norms which are autonomically 
established by a private person. 
Accordingly， legal effect of the civil law， superficially， isappeared to be given when 
a party wills the legal effect by the civil law. The intention for legal effect， though 
contrary to the popular theory， the author understands， isthe will to estalibhsh such 
autonomical legal norms. 
Therefore， the intention for the legal effect is， not the will for the legal effect by 
the civillaw， but the wilI fo 
5) Fritz von Hippel; Das Problem der rechtsgeschaftlichen Privatautonomie， p.91. 
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theory， isto confer the legal effect by the statutes when a party wills the legal effect of 
statute. Such conception， however， the author believes， must be revised as above. 
II Some Problems 
Some problems， ifwe understand the structure of act in the law as above， about 
act in the law， the athor believes， can be given the de五nitesolution. 
( 1) The intention for legal ef百fecはt The content of act in the law is th巴
ef鉦fect0ぱflegal norms of double巴-structuresautonomiたcal1匂yestablished by a pri釘va抗t巴
person within the limit of permission by the civillaw. 
And the content of act in the law is not the legal effect of the' civillaw which is to 
give the legal effect by the civil law to legal norms to be established autonomical1y. 
The problem about the intention for legal effect， which has long been disputed， can 
be solved if we take such a view. There are， mainly， two theories about the content 
of the intention for legal effect， namely，“the theory of legal effects" and “the theory 
of economical effect". 
The former insists that the content of the intention for the legal effect must be 
the will for the legal effect by the civi11aw， while the latter stresses that it must be the 
intention for the economical and social effect. The theory of legal effect is correct 
in pointing out that the intention for the effect must be legal. But this theory is over-
looking the fact that the intention for the legal effect must be the will for the effect 
of legal norms to be established autonomically. In other words， it is misleading in 
the point of stressing that the intention for the legal effect must be the legal effect by 
the civil law which is the law of authorization. 
If the intention for the legal effect， asstressed by the theory of legal effect， must 
be the will for legal effect which is to be given by the civil law， law-ignorants， as
often referred， are not able to contract. This is the decisive weak-point of the theory 
of legal effect. The theory of economical effect， though it is correct in pointing out 
that the intention for the legal effect should not be the wi1 for legal effects endorsed 
by the civil law， isa unilateral view since it overlooks that the intention for the legal 
effect must be of legal nature intended for the effect of legal norms established autono-
mically. In case of a party， without having the intention of legal obligation， promises 
a gift to his friend， asa gentleman's agreement or a social courtesy， such a promise， as
to give a gift as generally acknowledged， isdefect of legal nature. The theory of 
economical effect can not explain this case. In this case， the wiU for the economical 
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effect is clear1y seen. Accordingly， ifto have the will for the economical effect fulfil 
thecondition of intention for the legal effect， the valid legal証ctof gift is to be recogniz-
ed in the above case. 
Laws of authorization in the civil Iaw， asthe condition of act in the law， requires 
a party to desire the contents of legal norms estan1ished autonomically. And the civil 
law， to such legal norms established autonomically， gives the sanction (legal effect) 
by the civillaw. That a party intends the effect of legal norms established autonomical-
ly is different from that the party intends legal effect by civillaw. There is no direct 
relation there. From the point of the civil law， itgives the santion， within a certain 
limit which the civil law permits， tothe legal norms established autonomically by a 
party. On the condition of that a party wil1s the legal effect by the civil law， an ap帽
pearance of the civil law giving the legal effect to such declaratory acts takes palce. 
The prevailing theory tels us that act in the law is declaratory act which is given the 
legal ef，巴ctby the civil law on the condition of a party desires the legal effect by the 
civillaw. However， the popular theory is misled， the author belives， by the superficial 
outlook. The law， also in case of act of the law， can not be applied on the condition of 
a party desires the application of law. Al1 law is not of the nature that it gives the 
legal effect when a person instructed by the law desires the legal effect given by such 
a law. For， a legal norm， ina certain relation as described by law， instructs forcibly 
to perform a certain act. h is unconceivable that a law permits itself to lose the 
binding-force. 
( 2) Error of law If we understand the structure of act in the law above， 
the author be1ieves， we can get the clear solution to the problem of the errors of 
law. Though the principle of“error juris nocet" being acknowledged， there is a 
dispute of its application to act in the law. One stresses that the errors of laws must 
be not granted to act in the law， while other rebukes that since act in the laws， when 
the party desires the legal effect given by the civil law， isgiven the legal effect by the 
laws， errors of legal effect of declaration， natural1y， leads to the errors of contents of 
declaration of will. Above two views， superficially， appear completely contradicting. 
However， inauthor's view， this discrepancy is based on the erronous understanding 
乱boutthe structure of act i 
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of the legal norms established autonomically. It does not matter wheather such 
errors are derived from the error of facts or errors of law. 
In this respect， there is a difference between the errors of facts and errors of laws. 
The view that the errors of legal effects by civillaw， entirely， are theεrrors of contents 
of declaration， isnot understanding the fact that the general principle of "the application 
of laws， even if there is an error of law itself， must be observed" is also applied in act 
in the law. The error of law becomes， so far as it concerns with the legal norm 
autonomically established by a party， the error of content of act in the law. The civil 
law is comprised with imperative law， despositive law， general interpretation clauses. 
i) Error of imperative law 
Imperative law， disregarding the establishment of autonomical1egal norm by the 
party， isto be applied imperatively. Error of imperative law can not be an element 
of error of act in the law. The reason why the civil law acknowledges the complain 
of error， isto protect the real intention of a party. Therefore， the imperative law， 
being app1ied ignoring by the will of the party， does not grant the error. 
i) Error of dispositive "'law 
The dispositive law is to fulfil the defective part in declaration， ie.， itis to 
fulfil the gap when the declaration is incomplete and a gap is to be found in it. The 
dispositive law， ifthere is a declaration by a party， irrespective of content of dis-
positive law being the same or not same， the dispositive law is not to be applied， 
and in such a case， the norm of double structures is then put into force. 
On the contrary the general interpretation clause is， though there is a declaration， 
to discreet the meaning， in a certain manner as discribed by the civil law， of the 
declaration when its menaing is obscure. Content of declaration is， asmentioned 
above， the legal norm established autonomically by a party， which has no direct 
relation with the dispositive law， therefore， error of dispositive law， naturally， can not 
be the error of content of declaration. The legal e宜'ectof a dispositive law， the will 
of a party being not considered， isnot to be given by the civil law. The civil law 
does not consider the will of a party by the dispositive law. 
The legal effect of a dispositive law is， irrespective of the will a party， an impera四
tive effect accordingly， the error of dispositive law can not be the error of contents 
of the declaration. In sho 
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in the law， 
ii) The error of general interpretation caluses 
General interpretation clauses are， incase of the meaning of a declaration being 
obscure， todiscreet the meaning in a maneer as described by civillaw. For example， 
A concludes a contract to lease a goods to B for五vedays from today. In this contract， 
there is no definite description about the initial date， though the period of five days is 
clear1y mentioned. 
In such case， the mean of declaration， by the general interpretation clauses of 
Japanese Civil Law， art. 140， isto be decided. 
If the declaration of ‘'five days" by A does not imply the inital date to be included 
within the period， the content of legal norm established autonomically by A is the 
period of five days excluding the initial day. 
In this case， A has made an error in the legal norm which A is autonomically to 
establish， ie.， the content of act in the law. The error of the general interpretation， 
thus， becomes the error about the meaning of the declaration. In conclusion， the 
dispositive law and the general interpretation clauses by civil law， are dealt differently 
about the error. The law， though there is an error of law， isto be applied to the party. 
The imperative application of a law is not presupposing that every man knows the law， 
nor from th巴reasonthat every man is regarded to know the law. No body would be-
lieve that such a presumption that every mari knows the law can be valid in this com-
plicated law-life of today. The reason why that a party can not evade the application 
of a law inspite of the error of the law， isthat the obligatory force of a law can not be 
influenced by the fact that whether the party knows the law or not. 
Accordingly， the error of a law， does not necessarily signify the error of declaration. 
The error of a law becomes the error of content of a declaration when the error of a 
law is interrelated with the declaration itself. In other words， the error of a law must 
be the error of legal norm of double structures which a party autonomically establishes. 
Thus， the author believes that the problem of the error of the law must be attacked 
from such an angle. 
111 The Problem of Revision 
A revision can be brought to the Supreme Court only when an infringement of the 
Constitution or other statutes can be found in the previous judgement (Japanese Civil 
Precedure Law， art. 394). and it can not be brought of the ground insisting of the er-
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ronous judgement of facts. It has a practical significance to decide whether the inter-
pretation of act in the law is a matter of fact or matter of law. As the reader may be 
aware， this problem is widely disputed. The author believes， though it is regrettable 
that he can not be aIIowed to wel1 on this matter in detail， that the interpretation of 
act in the law is a matter of facts. 
Act in the law is an act of eatablishing legal norms， which is， asviewed from the 
point of civillaw， a legal fact， and which is regulated by the civillaw. It is because 
of the purpose of unfied interpretation and unified application of atatutes and orders 
that the grounds for revision are limited to the legal matters. So-called the law as 
to the legal matter， islaw in a formal sense， and not a legal norm in general. As men-
tioned repeatedly， the content of act in the law is the legal norm established by a party 
autonomically， there-fore， the interpretation of act in the law is to clarify the contents 
of these legal norms established autonomically by a party. We can explain the contents 
of these legal norms a party from the interpretation of the civillaw itself. There， the 
interpretation of act in the law is a matter of legal facts. 
IV Summary 
The thought that act in the law is to create the “law"， aseasily understood from 
the word， Rechtsgeschaft， isof an ancient origin. The conception of the "Law' in 
such a thought has not been clear as to the point what sort of structure it beard. The 
author feels very happy if his article has clari五edthe structure of the law. The author 
understood this as the legal norm of double-structures. 
